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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CRIMINAL LAW
Dale E. Bennett*
GENERAL SAVING STATUTE PREVENTS LEGISLATIVE PARDONS
In State v. Bowie, the defendant, who had been convicted of
fraudulently selling a mortgaged automobile, sought to have the
verdict and sentence set aside upon the last gasp technicality of
a "legislative pardon." It was urged that defendant's criminal
liability under the Chattel Mortgage Act of 19442 had been wiped
out when that statute was repealed and superseded by the Vehicle
Certificate of Title Act of 1950.3 This latter statute had been
enacted in the interval between the filing of the charge and the
conviction appealed from. Although the Certificate of Title
statute contains no special saving clause, the Supreme Court held
that any repeals effected thereby were automatically qualified
by the provisions of a 1942 general saving statute which had
been incorporated into the 1950 Revised Statutes. 4 This provision,
which expressly stipulates that a repealing statute shall not be
construed as extinguishing those penaties, liabilities, et cetera,
already incurred under the repealed law, "'was passed by the
legislature to do away with so-called "legislative pardons"...' "
The argument that the general saving provision was applicable
only to prosecutions pending prior to the adoption of the Criminal
Code of 19426 was dismissed as "without merit," since the pro-
vision applied to "any law" and contained no indication of any
such limitation.
Similarly, in State v. Robinson,7 the court rejected a "legis-
lative pardon" argument urged by a defendant who had been
convicted of violation of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Law. The
case was found to be on all fours with, and controlled by, the
recently decided case of State v. Mathe,8 where the Supreme
Court had rejected a similar defense after a careful analysis of
the nature of the Revised Statutes, with special emphasis on the
interpretation and saving section which had been placed in the
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 221 La. 41, 58 So. 2d 415 (1952).
2. La. Act 172 of 1944, La. R.S. 1950, 9:5358-5362.
3. La. Act 342 of 1950, La. R.S. 32:701 et seq.
4. La. Act 35 of 1942, La. R.S. 1950, 24:171.
5. 221 La. 41, 58 So. 2d 415, 417 (1952).
6. La. Act 43 of 1942, La. R.S. 1950, 14:1-142.
7. 221 La. 19, 58 So. 2d 408 (1952).
8. 219 La. 661, 53 So. 2d 802 (1951), discussed by writer in 12 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 125 (1952).
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introductory title." In reaffirming and applying the Mathe deci-
sion, Chief Justice Fournet also stressed the 1942 general savings
provision which was controlling in the Bowie case.
MURDER-FIcTIONAL MALICE AFORETHOUGHT ELIMINATED
The Criminal Code definition of murder 0 eliminated the
fictional common law requirement of "malice aforethought, ex-
press or implied." Symbolic of the unrealistic nature of this con-
cept was the fact that neither "malice" nor "aforethought,"
according to the generally accepted meanings of those terms, was
really necessary for murder at common law.' Rather than to
continue this vague and purely fictional label, relying upon past
decisions for its unnatural interpretation, Article 30 specifically
enumerated those situations in which homicide would constitute
murder.
In State v. Sears12 counsel for a twice-convicted murderer
sought to get his conviction set aside on the ground that the trial
judge had refused to instruct the jury that the presence or absence
of "malice" was the essential difference between murder and man-
slaughter. In overruling this contention, the Supreme Court
pointed out that the redactors of the Criminal Code had advisedly
omitted "malice aforethought" as a distinguishing element of
murder. Prior Louisiana decisions, rendered at a time when
Louisiana followed the common law definition of murder, were
merely indications of what the law was before the new statu-
tory definitions discarded the outworn "malice aforethought"
concept. The court also approved the trial judge's method of
instructing the jury by following the precise language of the
pertinent clauses of the murder and manslaughter articles of the
Criminal Code.13 In this regard, Justice McCaleb significantly
declared, "The difference between murder and manslaughter
appears clearly in the definitions set forth in Articles 30 and 31
of the Criminal Code and no further explanation is necessary
to one of ordinary intelligence. '14
9. La. R.S. 1950, 1:16.
10. Art. 30, La. Crim. Code of 1942; La. R.S. 1950, 14:30.
11. Clark and Marshall declare, in speaking of malice aforethought, "It
must be construed according to the decided cases, which give it a meaning
different from that which might be supposed." Clark and Marshall, Crimes,
§ 240(a) (5 ed. 1952).
12. 220 La. 103, 55 So. 2d 881 (1951).
13. Arts. 30(1), 31(1), La. Crim. Code of 1942; La. R.S. 1950, 14:30(1), 31(1).
14. 220 La. 103, 111, 55 So. 2d 881, 884 (1951).
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SIMPLE BURGLARY
The traditional method of defining crimes by means of
lengthy enumerations. was frequently susceptible to the defense
that the act or actor did not fit within any of the specified enumer-
ations. '5 In conformity with a policy of employing inclusive gen-
eral terms broad enough to cover fully the prohibited conduct,
the simple burglary article did not seek to list those structures
which might be the subject of burglary, and defined that offense
to embrace "the unauthorized entering of any vehicle, water
craft, dwelling or other structure, movable or immovable, with
the intent to commit any forcible felony or any theft there-
in. . ..
In State v. Route1 7 this crime was held to cover the entering
of a private office located in a New Orleans office building with
intent to commit theft. In so holding, the Supreme Court gave
the simple burglary article the broad application which had been
intended by the draftsmen and which was called for by the
broad language employed in the statutory definition. Defense
counsel had urged that, since the office was open to the public,
the entry could not be classified as "unauthorized." In support of
this contention he cited State v. Stephens"8 where the entering
of a department store during business hours, with intent to steal,
was held not to constitute burglary. Justice Ponder disposed of
that argument by succinctly stating that "[T]he pronouncements
in the Stephens case cannot be controlling in the case under
consideration for the reason that the offices of the steamship
company are private offices located in an office building. The
defendant did not enter the offices with the view of transacting
business with the corporation. His entry was unauthorized and
with the intent to commit theft."1 9 As an additional basis of
distinction, it should be noted that the Stephens case involved the
application of a burglary statute requiring a "breaking and enter-
ing," while the crime of simple burglary requires only an "unau-
thorized entering."
15. In State v. Fontenot, 112 La. 628, 36 So. 630 (1904) the court held that
the burning of a "merry-go-round outfit" was not within an arson statute
which enumerated "goods, wares, merchandise" and a long list of other
objects as possible of the offense. It made no difference that the act was "of
equal atrocity or of a kindred character with those which are enumerated."
16. Art. 62, La. Crim. Code of 1942; La. R.S. 1950, 14:62.
17. 221 La. 50, 58 So. 2d 556 (1952).
18. 150 La. 944, 91 So. 349 (1922).
19. 221 La. 50, 58 So. 2d 556 (1952).
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Defense counsel's hyper-technical argument that the offense
did not cover the entry of a room in an office building was like-
wise unavailing. Stressing the broad language employed in the
article, Justice Ponder concluded "As pointed out in the reporter's
comment, under this statute all types of entering not classified
as aggravated burglary are intended to be included. '20 In this
regard it is significant that the more limited crime of burglary of
"a dwelling house" has been held to include the burglarizing of
a hotel room.21
NONSUPPORT OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
The criminal neglect of family article of the Criminal Code
was broadened by a 1950 amendment 22 so as to embrace the non-
support of illegitimate children. Support of children born out
of wedlock constituted a rather substantial burden on the welfare
agencies, since the mother was usually without the means to
bring a civil suit to determine paternity and secure alimony
covering the child's support. It was the purpose of this statute
to provide a penal sanction which would facilitate enforcement
of the much neglected obligation of the father to support his
illegitimate child. Three 1951-1952 Supreme Court decisions23
placed a very severe restriction upon the practical effect of this
amendment, when they held that the prior establishment of a
civil duty to support, under the Civil Code, was a condition
precedent to criminal liability for nonsupport of the illegitimate
child. This meant that there could be no criminal action except
in situations where, prior to the nonsupport complained of, the
father had either acknowledged the child or had been judicially
declared its father in a civil action. In State v. Sims 24 Justice
Hawthorne contended, in a vigorous dissent, -that the statute itself
was the source of the duty to support the illegitimate child-
which duty arose out of the fact of parenthood and was not
dependent upon any prior special determination under the Civil
Code. Whether the requirement of previously established pater-
nity is justified by a normal interpretation of the 1950 statute is
a close question involving complicated legal issues and underlying
policy considerations which have already been carefully discussed
20. 221 La. 50, 58 So. 2d 556, 557 (1952).
21. People v. Carr, 255 Ill. 203, 99 N.E. 357 (1912); Clark and Marshall,
Crimes, § 407(b) (5 ed. 1952).
22. La. Act 164 of 1950, La. R.S. 1950, 14:74.
23. State v. Jones, 220 La. 381, 56 So. 2d 724 (1951); State v. Sims, 220 La.
532, 57 So. 2d 177 (1952); State v. Love, 220 La. 562, 57 So. 2d 187 (1952).
24. 220 La. 532, 555, 57 So. 2d 177, 184 (1952).
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in a previous issue of this REVIEW.25 The result of the decisions,
however, was very clear. The requirement of a previous acknowl-
edgment or adjudication of parenthood, as a prerequisite to crim-
inal law liability for nonsupport, served to prevent the direct and
simplified use of criminal law procedures and sanctions which
was contemplated by the proponents of the statute.
Discussion of these cases would not be complete without
mention of a subsequent further amendment of the criminal
neglect of family article.26 A 1952 statute seeks to make it abun-
dantly clear that the parent of an illegitimate child is under an
immediate statutory duty to support that child and that failure
to provide such support will result in criminal liability. The
language employed maintains a clear distinction between the
Civil Code procedures for establishing the civil obligations of a
parent to the illegitimate child and the basic general duty to
support such child which is imposed and enforced under the
criminal law. In view of this latest expression of legislative
intent it seems appropriate to review the policy considerations
involved in this somewhat controversial enactment. Its funda-
mental purpose is to shift the very substantial burden of support-
ing illegitimate children from the state's welfare agencies to the
shoulders of those who fathered this unfortunate group. The
professed danger that this law will be used as an instrument of
blackmail is largely obviated by the fact that district attorneys,
many of whom are not very sympathetic with the law because
of the extra work it places on their offices, will probably not
prosecute these cases unless they are completely satisfied of the
alleged parenthood. The sometimes cited possibility that the
criminal law dockets will be crowded by such cases is also more
imagined than real-for many fathers who formerly flaunted
their obligation will now be more cooperative as the result of a
penal sanction immediately available. Moreover, if a multitude of
these cases is expectable, that further serves to point up the need
for more effective measures to combat such social irresponsibility.
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
The court disposed of six cases involving insurance problems
during this term., It found unanimously that an insured had set
25. Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 301 (1952).
26. La. Act 368 of 1952, discussed 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 59 (1952).
0 Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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